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TIE BARINGS COLLAPSE: A
REGULATORY FAILURE, OR A FAILURE
OF SUPERVISION?
"Perhaps he did a little business he shouldn't have."'
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 1995, Barings PLC, the oldest and argu-
ably the most distinguished investment bank in England, col-
lapsed after sustaining a loss of approximately $950 million on
futures and options trading.2 The collapse renewed calls for
greater regulation of derivatives, and raised questions about
risk-management controls and oversight of trading operations
within banks as well as in corporations generally.3
The Barings collapse laid bare several problems within the
banking industry. The first is that internal controls are not
necessarily tight enough.4 Regulators had always asserted that
derivatives trading had been handled by experienced traders in
markets, such as the United States and Britain, where the
central banks exercised control and understood exactly what
was happening with given trades on a given day.5 However,
the failure of Barings Bank demonstrated that even a highly
respected and established bank such as Barings can have
faulty internal risk-management procedures.6
Second, the Barings collapse brings into question the
world banking system's safety from so-called "systemic" risk.
Barings, although it had a highly respected name, was a rela-
tively small bank. If a bank far larger than Barings, with
many times its net worth, had collapsed in a similar fashion,
the world financial system may have been threatened by panic
runs on banks and a resulting loss of liquidity.' However, "a
1. Bank of England Governor Eddie George, commenting on Nicholas
Leeson's trading losses of more than $1 billion, which sank Barings PLC, a British
investment bank. Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 19.
2. See Sara Webb et al., A Royal Mess: Britain's Barings PLC Bets on Deriv-
atives-and the Cost is Dear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at Al.
3. See Charles M. Seeger, How to Prevent Future Nick Leesons, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 1995, at A13.
4. See The Bank That Disappeared, EcONOMIsT, Mar. 4-10, 1995, at 11.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.; see also infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing
BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXII:3
consensus is forming that well-publicized derivatives-related
losses are more a function of poor management than inade-
quate regulation or 'intrinsic problems in the [OTC] derivatives
market.'"8 Most of the problems that have occurred with deriv-
atives, including the Barings Bank collapse, have occurred
largely because of failures in management and supervision,
rather than from any problems inherent in the derivatives
themselves.'
Third, a greater flow of information may be needed among
regulators in different parts of the world.'0 In 1993, U.S. Rep-
resentative Henry Gonzales noted that U.S. banks had admit-
ted that improvements in international regulatory coordination
were necessary, and that there was further a "desperate need
for more standardized and detailed disclosure of derivative
product activities."" While much of the blame for Barings'
collapse may be laid at the feet of Nicholas Leeson, 2 whose
derivatives trades brought Barings down, there also may be a
need for more information-sharing within the industry.
This Note argues that government regulation was suffi-
cient, and that it was not the lack of such regulation that
caused Barings Bank's problems before or after Nicholas
Leeson's illicit trades. Instead, better internal banking controls
and improved communication among those within the industry
are needed in the international trading of global derivatives in
order to prevent further incidents similar to the collapse of
Barings. International standardization efforts in the securities
field must focus on internal controls within firms that are
monitored by securities regulators.'4 Further, this Note exam-
systemic risk).
8. Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1993,
2019 (1995) (quoting Economists Roundtable Calls for No New Derivatives Rules,
REDEMPTION DIG. & SEC. INDUS. DAILY, Oct. 3, 1994, at 2) (alteration in original).
9. See The Beauty in the Beast, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 21, 22.
10. See Nicholas Bray, Top British Securities Regulator Seeks Closer Ties in
Wake of Barings Debacle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at B6A.
11. 139 CONG. REC. H3822 (daily ed. June 18, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gon-
zalez).
12. Nicholas Leeson was the 28-year old derivatives trader in Barings' Sin-
gapore office whose unauthorized trades caused losses that led to Barings' collapse.
See infra Part II.
13. See William B. Crawford, Jr., After Barings, Simex Repairs, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 19, 1995, at 1.
14. See U.K Securities Chief Cites Need for Improved Supervision, 27 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), No. 10, at 409, 410 (Mar. 10, 1995) [hereinafter U.K Secu-
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ines the collapse of Barings and the problems in supervision
that caused it.
Part II discusses the background of the Barings collapse,
and Nicholas Leeson's role in that collapse. Part III explains
derivatives and their risks. Part IV delineates the supervision
problems at Barings before the collapse. Part V outlines com-
munication problems on the exchanges that played a part in
the Barings disaster. Finally, Part VI proposes a manner in
which the collapse could have been avoided, and how similar
collapses can be avoided in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1992, Nicholas Leeson, a 28-year old English deriva-
tives trader for Barings PLC, arrived in Singapore, where
Barings was gradually expanding a small trading operation.15
Leeson had joined Barings in 1989 as a back-office clerk set-
tling trades. 6 Leeson soon moved from the back office to the
floor of the Singapore International Monetary Exchange
(Simex).'7 He showed himself to be an able and aggressive
trader, 8 and by 1993, he had graduated to general manager
of Barings Futures Singapore (BFS), 9 the operation that ran
the bank's Simex activities. 0
Leeson dealt mainly in contracts tied to fluctuations of
Japan's Stock Exchange.2' Leeson's job was meant to be a
low-risk form of arbitrage, taking advantage of price differenc-
es in the prices of Nikkei-225 futures contracts listed on the
Osaka Securities Exchange (Osaka) in Japan and Simex.2
Leeson would buy a futures contract in one market and sell it
for a slightly higher price in the other, thus profiting on the
rities Chief].
15. See Bill Powell, Busted!, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 37, 40.
16. See Richard W. Stevenson, Big Gambles, Lost Bets Sank a Venerable Firm,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at Al.
17. See Peter Martin, The Barings Collapse: Blunders That Bust the Bank,
FiN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at 24.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Powell, supra note 15, at 37.
22. See The Collapse of Barings, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4-10, 1995, at 19;
Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15; Powell, supra note 15, at 40.
1997] 737
BROOK. J. INTL L.
difference in price.13 When Leeson detected such a price dif-
ference, he would buy heavily in the lower-priced market and
sell in the other, generating earnings for the firm, as well as
for himself.' Leeson's positions were large, but this was not
particularly unusual; the volumes traded by arbitrageurs are
usually large because the margins on this type of trading are
small.' This strategy is not particularly risky because a long
position (i.e., a position that bets on a rise in the market) in
one market is offset by a short position (i.e., a position that
bets on a fall in the market) in the other market.26 Since each
purchase was effectively offset by a simultaneous sale, Leeson
would rarely have had an open position that could result in a
loss in the futures in which he was dealing." Based on this
apparently safe strategy, Barings believed that the trades that
Leeson was making were fully matched, with no real risk to
Barings.28 Further, because Leeson's strategy was thought to
be low-risk, he was allowed to both execute and settle his own
trades, that is, he was in charge of the paperwork to account
for the buying and the selling that he was doing.2
Leeson's strategy soon moved beyond arbitrage.0 He did
not hedge his positions, but rather, in the second half of 1994,
he began to gamble on the future direction of the Japanese
markets, and his unhedged positions quickly escalated.3 '
Leeson simultaneously sold put options (which give a right to
sell) and call options (which give a right to buy) on Nikkei-225
futures. 2 The put and call options were executed at the same
strike price, i.e., the price to which the Nikkei would have to
rise or fall for the buyer to exercise his option. 3 These deals
are known as straddles, and they make profits for the seller of
23. See Powell, supra note 15, at 40.
24. See Richard W. Stevenson, Young Trader's $29 Billion Bet Brings Down a
Venerable Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at Al.
25. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 19.
26. See id.
27. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15.
28. See Three Key Reasons Why Barings Lost Its Bearings, BUS. TIMES, July
22, 1995, at 5, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Three
Key Reasons].
29. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15.
30. See id.
31. See The Collapse of Barings, supra, note 22, at 19.
32. See id.
33. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24.
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the options as long as the market is less volatile than the op-
tion prices predict." The straddle is a bet on volatility, with
the trader betting that the market will not make any sharp up
or down movements. 5 Such a gamble makes money only if
the market remains stable;38 if the market moves out of the
trading range, quick losses result.37
In July 1992, fictitious account number 88888 had been
opened, apparently at Leeson's request. 8 The account had
supposedly been opened for a client.3 9 At first, the account
was included in copies of reports sent to Barings' head office in
London.4" However, the software program was later al-
tered-again, apparently by Leeson-to exclude account num-
ber 88888 from all the reports but one.4' The account, there-
fore, did not attract the attention of Barings in London."
Leeson conducted his unauthorized trading in futures and
options through account 88888, where he put the premiums
from all the unauthorized sales.43 At first, the markets per-
formed reasonably well; Leeson's options trading did not result
in losses." However, because of Leeson's trades, account
88888 ran up a loss of £208 million by the end of 1994.4" Al-
though he was racking up large losses, Leeson said, and
Barings believed, that he was making profits.46
On January 17, 1995, there was an earthquake in Kobe,
Japan, and the Tokyo stock market began to fall.47 The earth-
quake continued to affect the Japanese economy adversely, and
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Webb et al., supra note 2, at AT.
37. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15.
38. See Nicholas Bray, Barings Failed To React to Warnings Preceding Col-
lapse, Evidence Suggests, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1995, at B3A; The Collapse of
Barings, supra note 22, at 20.
39. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 20.
40. See Louis Beckerling, The Fall of the House of Barings, STRAITS TIMES
(Sing.), July 30, 1995, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strait File.
41. See id.
42. See Three Key Reasons, supra note 28, at 5.
43. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24.
44. See id.
45. See Beckerling, supra note 40, at 4.
46. See Three Key Reasons, supra note 28, at 5 (quoting excerpts from the
Bank of England's Board of Banking Supervision's Report).
47. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15.
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stocks continued to drop.48 Leeson had been betting that the
Nikkei index would stay in a trading range of around 19,000
points. By January 23, however, the index had fallen below
18,000 points.49 As a result, Leeson took up a position that he
believed would help support the Tokyo stock market and limit
his losses: instead of buying futures contracts in Osaka and
selling them in Singapore for a slightly higher price, Leeson
stopped selling contracts, but continued to buy them.5" Thus,
instead of holding a matched position that did not expose him
to losses in swings from the market,51 Leeson was holding an
open position, betting that the market would move up.52
Leeson continued to buy futures contracts, betting that the
Nikkei index would rise.5 3 Apparently, he was single-handedly
trying to hold up the market.'
Leeson also "shorted" futures on Japanese interest rates
and government bonds, that is, he sold contracts that Barings
did not own.55 If the Nikkei fell, the value of the shorted fu-
tures would rise because the trader could deliver on the con-
tract by buying later at the lower price, and pocketing the
difference.56 Leeson built up a futures position representing a
$7 billion bet that Japanese stock prices on the Nikkei would
go up; his futures contracts purchases represented about $22
billion of Japanese government bonds and Euroyen instru-
ments, a form of short-term government debt.57 The futures
contracts fell in value as the Nikkei index dropped, and at the
same time, interest rates fell, cutting the value of the bond
futures contracts.58
Exchanges such as Osaka and Simex use margin calls to
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24. Buying futures contracts can potentially
shore up the market because those selling the contracts may hedge their exposure
by buying the underlying asset. See id.
55. See Brad Stone, How He Busted the Bank, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at
39.
56. See Louis Beckerling, Barings: What Went Wrong-and Why, STRAITS
TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 12, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strait File.
57. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15.
58. See id.
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limit the risk that traders will default. 9 As a result, Leeson
had to pay a sum of money, called "initial margin,"" to Simex
as collateral against possible losses on the exchange.61 If the
market value of the futures falls, the exchanges where they are
purchased demand more money. 2 As Leeson's trading grew,
and as the Tokyo market fell, the funding requirements from
both Simex and the Osaka exchange increased.'
Leeson kept selling more options, using the funds that he
had placed in account number 88888 to pay margin calls on his
futures positions." When there was no money left in the ac-
count, he turned to Barings in London for the money."
Leeson asked Barings to write checks for the margin calls,
probably telling Barings that the trades were on behalf of a
client who would deposit the funds with Barings in a few
days.66 Thus, Barings may have believed that the trades were
agency trades on behalf of a client rather than proprietary
trades on its own account. Agency trades of such a magnitude
would have been out of the ordinary, but not exceptional. 7
Eventually, Leeson could not produce sufficient funds, and fled
Singapore.6 When Barings failed on February 26, it was hold-
ing more than $6 billion in Nikkei 225 futures and was short
$20 billion in Japanese bond and interest rate futures. 9
Barings lost a total of more than $1 billion on these posi-
tions.70
Although Barings could have been rescued, had the Bank
of England been willing to do so,71 such a rescue entailed find-
59. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24.
60. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 20.
61. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24.
62. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15.
63. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24.
64. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 20.
65. See id.
66. See Paula Dwyer et al., The Lesson From Barings' Straits: Treacherous
World Markets Demand Ever.Tougher Controls, BUS. WK., Mar. 13, 1995, at 30,
32. It is not altogether clear whether Leeson told Barings that the trades were for
a client, or whether Barings thought that Leeson had hedged his positions as
required by Barings trading strategy. See John Gapper et al., Barings Transferred
Cash to Dealer, FIN. TIMS, Mar. 2, 1995, at 1.
67. See The Charlie Rose Show (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1995) (in-
terview with Sir David Walker, Morgan Stanley, Europe).
68. See Dwyer et al., supra note 66, at 32.
69. See Stone, supra note 55, at 39.
70. See id.
71. Although the Bank of England's failure to rescue Barings has been criti-
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ing enough private money to recapitalize Barings. Potential
rescuers faced the possibility that Barings' open positions
would continue to increase, creating huge liability for any bank
that put up money.72 It was possible that the Nikkei index
would continue to drop and the exposures would double; pro-
spective rescuers could not have found a way to cap the poten-
tial liability.78 Because of the potential for unlimited liability,
there were no rescuers willing to bail out Barings.74 Nicholas
Leeson was extradited to Singapore, and in December 1995 he
was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.7
III. DERIVATIVES AND THEim RISKS
Before the collapse of Barings, most Americans had never
even heard of derivatives. However, with the collapse of
Barings and the bankruptcy of Orange County, California,
cized, it has also been suggested that it was better to let Barings go into adminis-
tration (roughly the British equivalent of bankruptcy) because it sent a message
that the Bank would no longer come to the rescue of any bank which had failed
to devise fail-safe systems for itself. Hence, banks would have to do a better job of
policing their own. It was further thought to reinforce the message that the job of
regulators is to contain a collapse and prevent a panic, not to make up for bad fi-
nancial judgment. See generally Marc Levinson, An Evil Virus Is Upon Us, NEWS-
WEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 49, 50; Martin Mayer, How the Market Regulates Deriva-
tives Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at A14; John Plender, No Time For a Res-
cue, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at 13.
Further, there is the problem of "moral hazard." By insulating banks from
their defaults, guaranteed rescue might reduce banks' incentive to monitor their
own houses closely. Banks can take great risks, knowing that they will be bailed
out if they make a fatal error. See Those Damned Dominoes, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4-
10, 1995, at 78; Mayer, supra, at A14. Moral hazard also is an argument against
heavier regulation; firms may believe that government will not let them fail and
thus may "free-ride" on the government's resources spent examining or supervising
other market participants. Wendy Lee Gramm, In Defense of Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 8, 1993, at A12.
72. See John Plender, The Box That Can Never Be Shut, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1995, at 17.
73. See id.
74. See John Gapper, Risk Too Great for British Banks, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1995, at 2. Eventually, Internationale Nederlanden Groep N.V. (ING), a Dutch
banking and insurance group, bought all three of Barings' businesses-securities,
asset management, and corporate finance-for an estimated £1 million. The price
was so low because ING took on nearly all of Barings liability, including the huge
losses that Leeson ran up. ING said it planned to inject approximately $1 billion
to bring Barings back to financial health. See Richard W. Stevenson, Dutch Con-
cern Is Set To Take Over Barings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at D5.
75. See Singapore Court Curbs Any Leeson Media Deals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5,
1995, at A16.
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derivatives became a more prominent feature of the financial
landscape. To understand the Barings affair, one must first
understand how derivatives work.
A. Derivatives Generally
Derivatives, the products traded by Nicholas Leeson in the
Barings disaster, are contracts or payment exchange agree-
ments whose value derives from the value of an underlying
asset, or from an underlying reference rate, such as an interest
rate. 6 The contract either allows or obligates the end-user to
buy or sell an asset."7 Changes in the value of the underlying
asset affect the value of the contract. 8 The contract "give[s]
one party a claim on an underlying asset (or the cash value of
an underlying asset) at some point in the future, and bind[s] a
counterparty to meet a corresponding liability."79 For exam-
ple, in a futures contract, one party has a right to sell a speci-
fied underlying asset, while the other party may have the
corresponding liability to buy it on the contract maturity
date." The agreement has a certain value to the parties to
the contract, which may be independent of its value on an open
market.8 The futures contract may describe an amount of
currency, a security, a physical commodity such as wheat, a
series of payments, or a market index.82 Both parties might
be equally bound by the contract, or the contract may offer one
party an option to exercise it or refrain from exercising it."3
Companies or individuals can use derivatives as a type of in-
surance policy, locking in currency or interest rate values for
long periods of time.'
76. See GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND
PRINCIPLES 28 (Group of Thirty eds., 1993) [hereinafter DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES
AND PRINCIPLES].
77. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Information-
al Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457,
1464 (1993).
78. See Rebecca Leon, Note, The Regulation of Derivatives and the Effect of
the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 321, 322 (1994).
79. The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 21.
80. See DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 32.
81. See Thomas C. Singher, Note, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational
Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to Congressional Action?, 18
FoRDHAmi INT'L L.J. 1397, 1401 (1995).
82. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 21.
83. See id.
84. See Saul Hansell, Derivatives as the Fall Guy: Excuses, Excuses, N.Y.
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The use of derivatives has grown rapidly in recent
years." In the early and mid-1980s, when information tech-
nology developed enough to allow for wider use of derivatives,
only the biggest multinationals were involved with deriva-
tives.86 But more recently, smaller corporations, pension
funds, insurance companies, money managers, and small- to
mid-size banks have begun to use the instruments.87 The
growing use has been encouraged by the internationalization of
capital markets, as well as by technological advances in com-
puters and telecommunications.88 It is estimated that deriva-
tives are now a $35-trillion worldwide market. 9 The increas-
ing use of derivatives has reinforced the integration of finan-
cial markets and hence has increased the market's vulnerabili-
ty.
90
Two groups of people use derivatives: dealers and end-
users.9' Usually, derivatives dealers are commercial banks or
securities firms; occasionally insurance companies and highly
rated corporations such as energy firms also deal in deriva-
tives.92 These institutions contract with buyers, or end-users.
End-users generally consist of "corporations, governmental
entities, institutional investors, and financial instituions."93
Derivatives can serve several functions. Since the transac-
tion costs for trading in a derivative are lower than that for
actually buying the underlying asset, the derivative can be a
cheaper alternative to investing in the underlying asset it-
self?4 Further, an end-user can arbitrage differences between
the' price of a derivative and the price of the underlying asset,
or, as Nicholas Leeson was initially doing, between prices in
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, § 3, at 1.
85. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 21.
86. See Tracy Corrigan & Patrick Harverson, Derivatives: Ever More Complex,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, § III, at 1.
87. See id. Further, two-thirds of the 500 largest American companies use de-
rivatives regularly. See Hansell, supra note 84, § 3, at 1.
88. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 21.
89. See 140 CONG. REC. S14,946, S14,947 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Mikulski).
90. See id.
91. See DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 34.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See Hu, supra note 77, at 1466.
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different capital markets. 5 Finally, derivatives allow end-us-
ers to either transfer or reduce their market risks since the
derivative gives insurance against adverse movements in the
market.9 6 For example, "a derivative that rises in value if oil
prices fall could protect a sheikdom, while one that rises along
with oil prices will insulate an airline."97
While there is, at first glance, a large and complex array of
over 1200 different types of derivatives contracts," the array
is not actually as complex as it looks. Every derivatives prod-
uct can be built from two fundamental types of basic contracts:
forward-type agreements or option-type agreements.9 For-
ward-type agreements include forwards, swaps, and exchange-
traded futures.' 0 Option-based transactions include private-
ly-negotiated options such as caps, floors, collars, and options
on forward contracts.'0 ' Further, derivatives can be split into
two broad categories: "those designed to manage risk-[that
is], to hedge-and those designed to accept risk to create high-
er return-[that is], to speculate." °2
An option is probably the most widely-used and familiar
type of derivative. In exchange for a payment of a premium, an
option contract gives the option holder the right, but not the
obligation, to buy or to sell the underlying asset at a stated
price, known as the strike or striking price, during a certain
period or on a certain date.' 3 The option might relate to any
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id. (footnote omitted).
98. See Clarence B. Manning, A Derivatives Primer for Corporate Counsel, or
Do You Know What Your Treasurer is Doing?, 2 AM. CORP. COUNS. ASSN No. 13,
Docket 6, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at *8, available in Westlaw, Accadkt Database. Types of
derivatives include futures, forwards, options, caps, collars, floors, swaps, and hy-
brids of these. See id; DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at
30-34; Cohen, supra note 8, at 2000-02. Some of the more esoteric and intimidat-
ing forms of derivatives are "mambo combo," "strangle," "surf and turf," "swaption,"
"death-backed bonds," "limbo," and "heaven and hell bonds." See Adam R.
Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the
Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1027 & nn.15-19 (1994). The
Comptroller of the Currency noted sardonically that names such as these are "ob-
viously designed to inspire confidence." Albert R. Karr, Bank Regulator Signals
Move on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A3.
99. See DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AD PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 29.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 29-30.
102. Cohen, supra note 8, at 1993 n.1.
103. See DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 32. The
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type of security, or to any index, currency, commodity, or other
derivative contract. °4
A forward-type contract, the other basic building block of
derivatives, obligates one party to buy and the other to sell a
specific underlying asset at a specific price and amount, and on
a specific date, in the future.0 5 Forward-type agreements
hedge risk because they freeze the price of the underlying
asset. °6 They are different from option-type contracts be-
cause the seller does not receive a premium in advance of the
time that an obligation comes due.' 7 Further, forward-type
agreements oblige a party to perform, rather than giving one
party the right but not the obligation to perform; neither party
may decline to perform if the price moves unfavorably.0 8
Sellers of options take into account that the option will not
be exercised, and they price the option accordingly.0 9 Buyers'
risk is limited to the premium,"' which is a fraction of the
cost of the underlying asset,"' because the buyer of an option
can choose simply to let the option expire without exercising
it."' The buyer can benefit from favorable movements in the
price of the underlying asset, but is not exposed to losses.'
On the other hand, the seller assumes a potentially unlimited
risk during the exercise period because the underlying asset
might move in the wrong direction."4 Thus, the seller hedges
the risk either by buying offsetting options,"5 or by gambling
that the buyer never exercises the option because it is not
economical to do so, in which case the seller will take the pre-
mium as its profit." 6 Regulators worry about the risk to the
right to buy the underlying asset is a call option, whereas the right to sell the
underlying asset is a put option. See Manning, supra note 98, at 8.
104. See Manning, supra note 98, at 8.
105. See DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 30.
106. See Hu, supra note 77, at 1467.
107. See Manning, supra note 98, at 8.
108. See id. at 9.
109. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22.
110. See id.
111. See Manning, supra note 98, at 8.
112. See DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 32.
113. See id.
114. See Hu, supra note 77, at 1469; Stanley J. Poling, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, Examination Guidance for Financial Derivatives, 1994 FDIC
Interp. Ltr., May 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fdie File.
115. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22.
116. See Manning, supra note 95, at 8.
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financial institutions that sell options; specifically, concern is
that in emerging markets, there are few providers for such
offsetting options."
B. Risks
Derivatives, unlike simple conventional securities trades,
have an inherent future obligation;" 8 a bargain will continue
between two parties since the obligations or liabilities of the
parties do not come into effect for a period of months or years
after a deal is made. When performance of an obligation or
liability is called for, one of the parties may find itself unable
to fulfill its obligation under the contract."' This possibility
links companies together for a long period over which it is
difficult to assess the risk.2 ' For example, a company that is
booming and well able to perform its obligations at the time
that it enters into a derivatives contract might see its fortunes
fall in the next five or ten years, thus hindering its ability to
perform under the contract at that time.
Further, it is possible that a party's inability to fulfill its
obligations under a contract would cause other parties to de-
fault on their obligations as well.' 2' This potential failure has
been referred to as "systemic risk."'22 Systemic risk is a dan-
ger because most derivatives transactions are not fully se-
cured, and derivatives traders often rely on payments coming
in from one contract to pay another.'23 If payments from one
contract should stop, then the user or dealer will have no way
of meeting her own payment obligations on another con-
tract." Thus, there may be a domino effect wherein failure
of one contract leads to failure of many other contracts. The
likelihood that this scenario will play itself out increases when
derivatives are traded among a fairly small number of partici-
117. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22.
118. See id. at 24.
119. See id. This type of risk may be referred to as "credit risk." Cohen, supra
note 8, at 2012.
120. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 24.
121. See Singher, supra note 81, at 1417.
122. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 7; see also The Bank that Disap-
peared, supra note 4, at 11.
123. See Waldman, supra note 98, at 1055.
124. See id.
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pants. 25 Currently, derivatives trading is limited to a rela-
tively small number of traders.' Since each entity carries on
such a large percentage of the dealing, a failure by one bank is
more likely to have a major effect upon the financial system.
In addition, derivatives may be highly leveraged, allowing
derivatives traders- to take great risks with comparatively
small amounts of capital.'27 The Economist gives the follow-
ing example:
A futures investor might put $100,000 down on a contract
committing him to buy $1 [million] worth of bonds in three
months' time. He then stands to make ten times the profit, or
ten times the loss, that he might make by buying $1 [million]
worth of bonds outright today and holding them for three
months.12
Moreover, the scale of leverage in derivatives is great.
Since banks often trade in derivatives on their own account
and not for clients, there is leverage at two levels. First, there
is financial leverage in the bank's balance sheet, and second,
there is leverage in the structure of the derivative itself.
29
When these two types of leverage are multiplied, the risk also
multiplies.
C. Positive Effects of Derivatives
While derivatives can be risky, they can also increase
financial markets' efficiency in several ways. 3 ' First, deriva-
tives allow firms that use them to be more selective in the
risks they bear, because the derivatives allow a redistribution
of those risks, thus making the financial system more resil-
ient."' Derivatives also make financial transactions less cost-
125. See id.
126. See Manning, supra note 98, at 8 n.4. In the United States, for example,
"derivatives dealing is concentrated among seven domestic banks (which trade
more than 90% of [derivatives] among all domestic banks), and five securities
firms (which trade more than 87% of [derivatives] among all domestic securities
companies) ... .. Id. These amounts account for approximately half of all global
trading in derivatives. Further, this concentration is compounded by inter-bank
borrowing throughout the world. See id.
127. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22.
128. Id.
129. See Plender, supra note 72, at 17.
130. See A Walk on the Wild Side, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, Survey, at 24, 25.
131. See id.
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ly because they are cheaper to use than the cash markets,"2
and a user can buy an option contract for far less than he
would pay for the actual underlying asset. 3' Furthermore,
derivatives may be more efficient and less, risky because, un-
like cash instruments, derivatives can be customized to meet
the specific investment goals of the user, and the user can
hedge risk in a manner closely resembling the actual risk.'
This type of customization is not possible with ordinary securi-
ties.' Thus, the user is provided with the most cost-effective
and risk-adverse vehicle for investment.'36
Second, derivatives also increase liquidity in financial
markets by expanding the opportunities for trading, hedging,
and investing, thus increasing opportunity for profit and eas-
ing the way for certain transactions to occur.3 7 For example,
exporters would be less likely to accept large orders if they
could not take out forward contracts setting in advance ex-
change rates for their foreign revenues, and investment funds
might not put as much money in securities markets if they
could not buy stock and bond options to protect their
portfolios. 8'
Third, derivatives make it easier for users to arbitrage
across different markets; this increases opportunity for profit,
thus increasing the possibility that traders will continue to
trade and keep the markets liquid.3 9 This is the type of trad-
ing in which Nicholas Leeson was engaging; before the trades
went awry, Leeson brought in large profits for Barings.
Fourth, by using contracts that lock in current prices,
132. See id.
133. See Hu, supra note 77, at 1465-66.
134. See Waldman, supra note 98, at 1030.
135. See id.
136. See Derivative Financial Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomms. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 5
(1994) (statement of Peter Vinella, Senior Consultant, Smith Barney Shearson).
137. See A Walk on the Wild Side, supra note 130, at 25.
138. See Time to Call the Risk-Busters, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 17, 1995, at 18, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Asiawk File.
139. See A Walk on the Wild Side, supra note 125, at 25; see also Risk Man-
agement of Financial Derivatives, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Bank-
ing Circular No. 277, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 62,152, at 71,703-04 (Oct.
27, 1993) [hereinafter Banking Circular No. 2771. It is, of course, devoutly to be
hoped that arbitrageurs will have more luck in this endeavor than Nicholas
Leeson did.
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users of derivatives can reduce exposures to interest rate
changes or currency fluctuations. 4 ' For example, if a bank
finances the exports of a Silicon Valley chip manufacturer, the
bank may agree to accept payment six months later in Japa-
nese yen. Currency forwards will allow the bank and the man-
ufacturer to make the commitment without bearing currency
risk because the exchange rate can be locked in." Thus, de-
rivatives can be used to stabilize cash flows, which in turn en-
courage greater long-term investment, helping markets to
function more easily.
Finally, derivatives lessen volatility by efficiently shifting
risk from parties less able or willing to bear it to others with
the resources to more readily absorb such risk in exchange for
a potential profit.'42 This shifting can give users greater flexi-
bility in managing risk, since the users can separate different
types of risks in financial instruments and transfer certain
risks to the parties better able or better willing to take
them." Considering all the advantages of derivatives, they
should actually make financial markets work better, rather
than making them more volatile.
IV. PROBLEMS IN SUPERVISION
There are varying points of view as to the reasons for
Barings' downfall. Some commentators have proposed an in-
crease in regulatory controls in the wake of Barings. For exam-
ple, Congressman Edward Markey stated that the Barings
episode
underscored the risks inherent in failing to assure that regu-
lators have adequate tools on hand to minimize the potential
for OTC derivatives to contribute to a major disruption in the
financial markets, either through excessive speculation and
overleveraging, or due to inadequate internal controls and
risk management on the part of major derivatives dealers or
end users.'"
140. See Banking Circular No. 277, supra note 139, 9 62,152, at 71,704.
141. See Recent Derivatives Losses: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Bank.
ing, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 73 (1994) (testimony of Lewis Teel, Exec-
utive Vice President, Bank of America).
142. See Banking Circular No. 277, supra note 139, T1 62,152, at 71,704.
143. See id.
144. 141 CoNG. REC. E447 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep.
[Vol. MXII3750
THE BARINGS COLLAPSE
Also, two weeks after the Barings collapse, the chairman of
England's Securities and Investments Board Chairman called
for more effective global oversight by securities regulators in
order to prevent further incidents such as that at Barings.'45
However, the collapse of Barings does not support the argu-
ment that there should be tighter regulation of derivatives, or
an outright ban on their use.'46 As mentioned previously, de-
rivatives can actually increase market efficiency. 47 Regard-
less of derivatives' potential risks, Barings' collapse can be
more easily attributed to lack of proper internal controls than
to a lack of regulatory controls.
A. Weaknesses in Controls
The complexity of products such as derivatives makes it
possible for the actions of one trader with too much power and
too little oversight to damage any financial institution, even a
highly respected and apparently stable one such as
Barings. 45 The complexity of derivative instruments makes
supervision difficult, and thus, the top levels of supervision
may be unable to detect improprieties easily. As can be seen in
the managerial failure at Barings and its disastrous results,
"self-policing" plays a critical role in increasingly complex fi-
nancial markets.'49 That derivatives' problems, at least par-
tially, result from basic failures of management is evident from
the problems that other firms have had with derivatives. 50
Kashima Oil lost $1.5 billion trading foreign-exchange deriva-
tives;'5' Procter & Gamble lost $102 million in a gamble on
interest-rate movements;'52  Metallgesellschaft, a German
Markey).
145. See U.K Securities Chief, supra note 14, at 410. The Chairman also called
for better internal controls at investment firms. See id.
146. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 21.
147. See supra Part III.C.
148. See Gerald H. Silk, Supervisory Responsibilities of the Broker-Dealer: Self-
Regulation of the Regulated 2 n.5 (May 1995) (unpublished paper on file with
author).
149. See id.
150. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22.
151. See id. Kashima Oil did not hedge the foreign-exchange risk associated
with importing oil priced in dollars into Japan, where it was sold in yen. See id.
152. See id. at 21; Dwyer et al., supra note 66, at 30-31. Procter & Gamble
itself admitted that the derivatives on which it lost money were inappropriate to
its needs and replaced its own treasurer. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note
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commodities conglomerate, lost $1.4 billion on oil deriva-
tives; 53 and Kidder Peabody lost $100 million when its chief
government bond trader manufactured false bond trading prof-
its by entering non-existent trades into its computer sys-
tem."M Most of these problems were caused by a lack of man-
agement controls in the firms, and not from unavoidable prob-
lems with the derivatives themselves.55
The most obvious failure contributing to the Barings col-
lapse was the managerial failure on the part of Barings itself.
In an interview, Nicholas Leeson said, "It was advantageous to
me that the... senior people in London that were arranging
these payments, didn't understand the basic administration of
futures and options, and that was probably the biggest failing;
they wanted to believe." 55 Because of the incredible profits
9, at 22; see also Kelley Holland et al., The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., Oct.
16, 1995, at 106, 110.
153. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22. Metallgesellschab sold
long futures contracts and hedged the exposure with short futures contracts; how-
ever, the price of the long contracts rose and the price of the short contracts fell.
See id. Metallgesellschaft also purchased 120 times the number of futures con-
tracts it needed to offset its exposure. See Waldman, supra note 98, at 1042 n.128.
154. See Trading into Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at D6.
155. See The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 9, at 22. A disturbing addendum
to the Barings affair occurred in September 1995, when the Daiwa Bank of Japan
lost $1.1 billion because of unauthorized bond trading in its New York office. See
Saul Hansell, Big Japanese Bank Says Trader Lost $1.1 Billion on Deals in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995, at Al. In the Daiwa incident, Toshihide Iguchi, an
executive vice-president of Daiwa, made approximately 30,000 unauthorized trades
over a period of 11 years. See id. In order to cover up the losses from the trades,
he illicitly sold securities belonging to the bank and its customers. See Peter
Truell, A Japanese Bank Is Indicted in U.S. and also Barred, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1995, at Al [hereinafter Truell, Japanese Bank Indicted]. Daiwa, however, with
$313 billion in assets, was a far larger bank than Barings, and was able to sus-
tain the loss, although the loss likely wiped out almost all of Daiwa's profit for
the first half of the 1995 fiscal year. See Hansell, supra, at Al. Eventually, it
transpired that Daiwa had conspired with Iguchi to hide the trading losses from
U.S. officials by, among other things, failing to record losses on its book and sub-
mitting false balance sheets to the federal reserve. See Truell, Japanese Bank
Indicted, supra, at Al; see also John R. Wilke et al., In a Signal to Japan, U.S.
Bars Daiwa Bank and Indicts Institution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at Al. As a
result, the federal reserve terminated Daiwa's U.S. operations and filed criminal
charges against the company. See id. However, the federal reserve itself was
faulted for failing to "ask the right questions" and expose the cover-up earlier.
Peter Truell, Fed Missed Big Opportunity on Daiwa, Ex-Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1995, at Al. The case has parallels with that of Barings; Iguchi, as well
as Leeson, was allowed both to conduct trades and record them, thus allowing him
to conceal his losses and unauthorized transactions. See Andrew Pollack, U.S.
Holds Trader in Bank's Big Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at Al.
156. Agis Salpukas, Barings Trader Questions Monitoring by His Superiors,
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that Leeson was making, "they weren't willing to question, or
they were less inclined to question."57 Moreover, the weak-
ness of internal control at Barings went unnoticed by internal
and external auditors, as well as the authorities in Singapore.
Even the Bank of England, which was responsible for supervis-
ing the Barings Group, failed to observe the weakness of inter-
nal control at Barings."5 ' Had the failure been noticed,
Barings might have tightened controls, and thus might have
been quicker to notice the huge positions that Leeson was
taking, allowing it to withdraw from the market and cut its
losses.
Another glaring problem was that Barings allowed Leeson
to engage in functions that created a fundamental conflict of
interest. Leeson was both trader and manager, and settled his
own trades.'59 When Barings allowed Leeson to fulfill both of
those functions it violated the Osaka exchange rules, as well as
industry practice, which keeps traders separate from back-
office staffers who confirm transactions and write checks. 60
Barings was well aware that allowing Leeson to wear two
hats-that is, to be in charge of both trading and accounting
for his trades-was not considered proper practice. 6' A possi-
ble explanation for the lack of controls was stinginess in man-
agement. 61 In fact, cost cutting was Barings' stated reason
for allowing Leeson to both conduct and settle trades.
1 63
While chief executives do not have objections to heavy spend-
ing on traders and trading systems, because those things add
N.Y. TIMIES, Sept. 11, 1995, at D4.
157. Id.; see also The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 20 (suggesting that
Barings was happy to give Leeson more money to meet margin calls because the
"client" had earlier given them so much commission, and concluding that "this
suggests a cavalier attitude to customers as well as to internal controls").
158. See Plender, supra note 72, at 17. The Bank of England gave the main
reasons for Barings' collapse as "unauthorized and concealed trading activities
within Baring Futures Singapore" and "a serious failure of controls and managerial
confusion within Barings." Three Key Reasons, supra note 28, at 5.
159. See Dwyer et al., supra note 66, at 32. Apparently, Barings allowed
Leeson to clear trades because he had previously been a settlement clerk at Mor-
gan Stanley & Co. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Saul Hansell, A U.S. Look for Lessons In Barings, N.Y. TIMS, Mar. 6,
1995, at D1.
162. See id.
163. See Mark Clifford, Baring Down: In British Bank's Collapse, a Warning to
Others, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 9, 1995, at 61, 61.
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to the bottom line, they object to spending money on proper
controls, because they see controls simply as expendable over-
head." In other words, "You see lots of securities firms that
give $5 million bonuses to traders. You'll have to look very
hard to find a securities firm that pays a $5 million bonus to
its internal auditor . . "" Because Barings chose the cheap-
est and least complicated path, allowing Leeson to perform
both trading and clearing functions, it could not possibly as-
sure that trading functions were properly overseen. There was
nothing hindering Leeson from making any trades that he
wanted, and thus, his unsupervised trades brought about the
bank's downfall.
The real problem in the Barings collapse was in the inter-
nal supervision, rather than in the instruments being used. 6 '
Although Barings has contributed to a fear of derivatives, most
of the fear comes from extremely complex types of derivatives
or from derivatives that are traded over the counter, not from
derivatives traded on an exchange, where trades are backed by
their members' resources. 67 The derivatives that Nicholas
Leeson traded were basic types of exchange-traded derivatives;
they were not particularly complex derivatives, as were the
derivatives that caused problems for Procter & Gamble, 6 '
164. See Hansell, supra note 161, at D2.
165. Levinson, supra note 71, at 50.
166. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 21.
167. See id.
168. Procter & Gamble lost $102 million on interest rate swaps, a particularly
complex type of derivative wherein a company that is paying a fixed rate on a
bond issue is relieved of the duty to pay it, instead agreeing to pay a floating
rate. See Floyd Norris, Procter's Tale: Gambling in Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1994, § 3, at 1; Holland, supra note 152, at 107. Interest rate swaps are more
complex and more risky than the "plain vanilla" derivatives on which Leeson lost
money. See id. Further, Procter & Gamble admitted that its own internal proce-
dures were not followed when it agreed to this derivative. See Richard Lapper,
International Capital Markets: Study Calls for Exchange to Clear OTC Contracts,
FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1994, at 29; Saul Hansell, A Bad Bet for P.& G., N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at D6. Thus, Procter & Gamble's loss was probably caused,
at least partially, by management failure; the company reassigned two of the em-
ployees involved with the derivatives, and its treasurer, who was also reassigned,
took early retirement. See Holland, supra note 152, at 110. Further, Procter &
Gamble alleged that Bankers Trust, which sold them the derivatives, engaged in a
systemic scheme to defraud its clients, causing huge losses to those clients, and
has filed suit against Bankers Trust claiming $195.5 million in damages. See id.
at 108-09. Thus, it seems that a combination of fraudulent practice and the failure
of management, not failure of derivatives per se, were responsible for Procter &
Gamble's losses.
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nor were they traded over the counter. Exchange-traded deriv-
atives are less risky than over-the-counter derivatives because
customers must put up money in order to trade. That was done
in the Barings disaster; Leeson put up money first from ac-
count number 88888, in which he had deposited premiums
acquired through unauthorized trades, and when that ran out,
he put up money that Barings had supplied to him without
making the proper inquiries."9 Furthermore, on exchanges,
traders are required to mark their contracts to market (i.e., to
revalue the contracts up or down, in line with closing prices)
each day.7 ' Therefore, there was no real problem with the
methods or instruments being used to trade. If the discipline of
marking to market did not work in this case, it was likely
because of concealment by Leeson. 7' Given the lax manage-
ment at Barings, Leeson could just as easily have run up large
losses in the cash markets as in the derivatives markets. 72
Moreover, since derivatives are a relatively new tool, man-
agement in most firms does not fully understand how deriva-
tives work. It is suspected that management does not fully
understand how to manage the risks that derivatives pose."
This failure of management was part of the reason that Nicho-
las Leeson was allowed to engage in unauthorized trading on a
huge scale, thus bringing about Barings' collapse. At the time
that new instruments were entering the market, some regula-
tors worried that neither the securities houses that designed
the instruments nor the corporate customers who used them
fully understood the risks. 74 As simpler, more established
products declined and more complex derivatives with higher
yields came to the forefront, some securities houses and banks
rushed into using the instruments because the returns were
higher; however, the risks were not well-understood.75 And
169. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
170. See Plender, supra note 72, at 17.
171. See id.
172. See Marc Levinson, Derivatives? What Are Derivatives?, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
13, 1995, at 50.
173. See Stevenson, supra note 16, at D15 (interviewing Anthony W.G. Lord, a
former chief executive of Baring's, who noted, "Management these days in most
firms did not [grow] up learning about derivatives as part of their ABC's, and
most-99 percent--don't fully understand [them].').
174. See Patrick Harverson, It's Time to Know What's Going On, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1992, § III, at 11.
175. See id.
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in 1992, a senior regulator in England commented presciently,
"We feel that some directors are not wholly comfortable with
derivatives, and they don't know anybody who they can trust.
There is a gulf between the top and medium level that is not
being wholly bridged."' Although Leeson was using a simple
type of derivative rather than a complex one, management at
Barings does not appear to have been fully cognizant of what
Leeson was doing; the report of the Board of Banking Supervi-
sion confirmed that the executives at Barings "did not ade-
quately understand their own business."'
The weakness of control was not endemic only to Barings.
A partial confirmation of directors' discomfort with derivatives
comes from a 1994 survey by the Group of Thirty, which noted
that many directors of derivatives dealer firms do not fully
understand the uses and risks of derivatives.' Many boards
of directors appear to have some knowledge of derivatives, but
rely heavily on the next level of management for derivatives
deals. Only a relatively small percentage of directors ap-
pear to have a "good" understanding of the concepts and risks
behind derivatives, and some directors apparently have "little"
understanding of them.8 ° This survey lends support to the
notion, expressed by one former regulator, that "[tihe one thing
we need more of, to put it succinctly, is gray hair."8' Before
176. Id.
177. Nicholas Denton, Managers 'Did Not Understand Their Business," FIN.
TIMES, July 19, 1995, at 6.
178. See Anne Schwimmer, Derivatives Survey Measures Lack of Understanding
at Top, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Apr. 4, 1994, at 4.
179. See id.
180. See id. The exact percentages in the study are: 65% percent of directors in
derivatives dealer firms said that their board of directors have "some knowledge
but rely heavily on the next level of management on the use of derivatives"; 28%
said their directors have "a good understanding of the concepts and risks"; 8%
said their directors have "little understanding of them." Id.
181. Hansell, supra note 161, at D2 (interviewing E. Gerald Corrigan, chairman
of Goldman Sachs International Advisers). The remark is meant to suggest that
many of the derivatives traders, like Leeson, are young men who are not averse
to taking risks; if more experienced people became familiar with derivatives, un-
necessary risk-taking might be reduced. It has also been suggested that "[tihirty-
year-olds manage mutual funds for the same reason we sent 20-year-olds to fight
our wars-they don't realize they could get killed out there." Po Bronson, The
Young and the Reckless, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A27. In addition, Barings'
older management may have wanted Leeson to take risks because "they had lived
through too many financial swings to take the risks themselves." Id.; see also Saul
Hransell, For Rogue Traders, Yet Another Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at D1
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directors can control derivatives, they must learn how deriva-
tives work and how to control their risks.
Even when Barings did finally become aware of defects in
control, top management still did not take sufficient action.
Barings evidently had been warned in the summer of 1994
about the internal accounting flaws that enabled Leeson to
hide his illicit trades. 2 In a memo to senior Barings PLC
officials, Baring Securities Ltd.'s former treasurer specifically
raised the possibility that Leeson had the opportunity to com-
mit fraud because he played "too dominant a role looking after
both trading ... and settlement aspects of the busi-
ness .... .""' Further, the treasurer noted that the level of
margin calls paid by Barings in London was a concern, since it
did not know precisely on whose behalf the cash was paid.'
However, Barings officials neither took any action to fix the
shortcomings, nor did they mention those shortcomings in an
internal audit report that was delivered to the bank's operat-
ing departments."5 In addition, in December 1994, Simex
alerted Barings officials to account 88888 and queried an ap-
parent shortfall in margin payments; however, Barings did not
immediately respond because external auditors were in the
process of examining the Singapore unit's books, and Barings
officials did not want to draw attention to something that
might cause problems with the audit.88 Instead, the Singa-
pore Finance Director told Simex that discrepancies could be
explained by adding together the bank's proprietary trading
and its trading on behalf of clients. 87 This is just another ex-
ample of the laxity of controls at Barings, for no matter how
vigilant auditors are, they cannot possibly be effective if they
are ignored, as they were in the Barings case.
Not only were the formal controls at Barings a problem,
but Barings was also strikingly unaware of what the rest of
the market was saying.i8 For example, in 1994, an internal
(suggesting that a common problem is a "financial generation gap" and that senior
managers who are supposed to be monitoring do not understand derivatives and
take a laissez-faire attitude toward young financial traders).
182. See Bray, supra note 38, at B3A.
183. Id. (interviewing Ron Baker, Barings' derivatives chief).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Peter Martin, When New into Old Won't Go: An Attempt to Combine
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memo within a rival bank pointed to Barings' trading strategy
in Nikkei futures as potentially risky.'89 If a source outside
Barings' own management could see that Barings' positions
exposed them to the possibility of losses, it is surprising that
Barings' management did not take steps to reduce the risk to
which it was being exposed.
In addition, Barings did not appear to have informal com-
munication links with exchanges, which may have allowed it to
detect surging trade volumes. 9 ' Barings also lacked random
checks to see how well personnel were following Barings' rules,
nor did Barings have any independent risk-management units,
as do some investment banks such as Merrill Lynch.' 9 ' Since
the value of derivatives contracts can fluctuate widely even on
small movements in the underlying asset, it was vital that
Barings employ independent controls where derivatives were
concerned in order to control risk.'92 Barings failed to do this.
Bank supervisors traditionally rely on "people, controls,
capital, and liquidity" to provide internal checks and balanc-
es.'93 In Barings' case, there were obviously problems with
people and controls. Even if regulators had placed more strin-
gent controls on capital and liquidity within Barings, such
controls would have made no difference without internal con-
trol over the first two categories of people and controls.
"[C]apital discipline was meaningless," 94 because Leeson ac-
tively tried to conceal losses from Barings' management.'
Additionally, "the liquidity discipline of margin calls was neu-
tered by a strategy of Mr. Leeson's which would appear to have
been fraudulent."'98 Thus, because Leeson effectively evaded
management, Barings fell.
Old-Style Banking with a Free-Wheeling Securities Business Sealed Barings' Fate,
FIN. TIAIES, Mar. 4, 1995, at 8.
189. See id.
190. See Dwyer et ah, supra note 66, at 32.
191. See id.
192. See id; see also infra Part VI.B.
193. Plender, supra note 72, at 17.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Id.
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B. Present Regulatory Structures Are Adequate
As one commentator has noted, "systemic risks are not
appreciably aggravated [by the use of derivatives], and supervi-
sory concerns can be addressed with the present regulatory
structures and approaches."9 ' Moreover, government and in-
dustry groups have studied derivatives and have "uniformly
concluded that their use is no riskier than investing in the
underlying stocks or bonds themselves."'98 The main differ-
ence is the speed with which derivatives can increase the value
of an investment portfolio.'99 A study by the Group of Thirty
concluded that "d]erivatives by their nature do not introduce
risks of a fundamentally different kind or of a greater scale
than those already present in the financial markets."00
V. PROBLEMS WITH INTER-INDUSTRY COMMnNICATIONS
Although present regulatory structures are adequate, the
performance of the exchanges in Osaka and Singapore might
have been improved.20 ' Neither of them tried to find out why
Barings was taking such large positions.0 2 This likely indi-
cates that there is a need for better information sharing be-
tween exchanges, and a need to pool information.0 '
Barings' demise shook investor confidence in the Simex.
Although the Barings collapse did not lead to a world-wide
panic or collapse of markets, failure of an exchange member
could potentially engulf the exchange and wreak havoc
throughout the international financial system.0 4 While no
regulatory system can completely eliminate the possibility of
fraud or mismanagement, there is a need for more cooperation
and information sharing within the industry in order to avoid
potentially dangerous problems in the international financial
system. °5
One issue raised by the Barings collapse is the need for
197. Id.
198. Hansell, supra note 161, at D2.
199. See id.
200. Plender, supra note 72, at 17.
201. See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 22, at 21.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Crawford, supra note 13, at 7.
205. See id.
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better communication between international regulators."'
Leeson was trading huge amounts of Japanese stock contracts
in two markets, Singapore and Osaka. Since the Osaka ex-
change never communicated with Barings about Barings' posi-
tions, regulators in both markets did not know whether Leeson
was properly covering his exposure in the other market."' In
fact, the two exchanges rarely communicate at all.2"8 With
the expansion of global markets, "a regulatory framework
based on individual countries is increasingly ineffectual at a
time when the operations of large financial institutions are
becoming more global,"0 9 and there should be more self-polic-
ing." In addition, where cross-border trading is involved,
markets should take it upon themselves to communicate with
markets across the border of their own countries.2 ' Commu-
nication between the Singapore and Osaka markets might
have exposed Leeson's activities sooner, and thus might have
reduced the damage to Barings.
Further, intra-exchange communication should be more
effective. For example, the problems at Barings were exacer-
bated by the fact that key staff could not be contacted for forty-
eight hours, because their home phone numbers were not
available.1 2 It also would have been helpful for Simex to
have taken more definite steps to ensure that dealers did not
take charge of settlements, as Nicholas Leeson was doing, and
Simex should also have made sure that proprietary traders did
not also handle customer business.2"' In the wake of the
Barings disaster, Simex did undertake to add these precau-
tions,1 4 and most exchanges reviewed their own policies and
206. See Paul Blustein, For Singapore, It's a Sling: Barings Case Shakes Image
of Nation Known for Probity, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1995, at Fl.
207. See id.; Martin, supra note 17, at 24. The senior executive governor at the
Osaka exchange says that the exchange will not try to communicate with a finan-
cial institution if it has large positions in the future, preferring instead to give
priority to market forces. See id. This, obviously, may render better communication
somewhat difficult.
208. See Martin, supra note 17, at 24. Apparently, officials from the Singapore
and Osaka exchanges have met together only three times. See id.
209. Spot the Smoking Receivable, ECONOIST, Oct. 21-27, 1995, at 79, 80.
210. See Blustein, supra note 206, at F2.
211. See id.
212. See Richard Lapper, Report .Calls for Broad Reform of Derivatives, FIN.
TIMES, June 20, 1995, at 25.
213. See Peter Montagnon & Kieran Cooke, Prompt Treatment for Futures
Shock, FIN. TINES, Mar. 3, 1995, at 17.
214. See id. It has also been suggested that Simex may have been lulled into
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assessed their own controls.215
In addition, exchanges, regulators, and futures trading
firms have called for an international harmonization of rules,
as well as information sharing, to prevent another failure
based on faulty assumptions or misinformation.216 For exam-
ple, Japanese regulations should have required that customers'
accounts on the Osaka exchange be separated from Barings'
own, as do regulations in many other countries. Some regu-
lators say that wider disclosure of Barings' large positions
might have called attention to the situation from outside of
Asia, thus preventing Barings' collapse.1 ' Elizabeth Sam,
Chairwoman of Simex, also acknowledged that officials could
take a tougher approach with firms that take large positions,
like those Barings took.1 '
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, a commit-
tee of banking supervisory authorities,220 and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),22'
issued a joint statement to help harmonize derivatives practic-
es across borders and industriesY2 The report recommends
appropriate oversight by boards of directors and senior man-
agement, adequate risk management and monitoring process-
es, accurate and reliable management information systems,
and thorough audit procedures.2" Additionally, the guidelines
establish recommended written polices and procedures outlin-
complacency by the fact that Leeson had a very good relationship with it; Leeson
was by far the biggest trader of Nikkei contracts, and he had advised Simex on
its own settlements systems. See Hu-bris, ECONOIIST, Mar. 4-10, 1995, at 72, 73.
215. See Faith in Futures, ASIAWEEK, May 19, 1995, at 53.
216. See Crawford, supra note 13, at 7.
217. See Suzanne McGee, Reform Sought to Prevent Future Barings, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 17, 1995, at C1.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Singher, supra note 81, at 1462 n.494. The primary aim of the com-
mittee is "to promote gradual transnational convergence of supervisory practices
governing financial institutions." Id.
221. IOSCO is a commission formed to provide a forum for securities regulators
from different countries to promote transnational cooperation in the development of
securities laws. See id. at 1462 & n.495.
222. See HK Issues BasleIOSCO Guidelines for Consultation, Reuters, Aug. 1,
1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Reubus File [hereinafter Basle/IOSCO
Guidelines].
223. Basle Comm. & IOSCO Tech. Comm., Basle Committee on Banking Super-
vision, News Release 94-79, July 27, 1994, at 1 (joint press statement, on file with
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
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ing management guidance that the board of directors must
approve. The guidelines are non-binding, but the Basle Com-
mittee was hopeful that the guidelines would facilitate a pru-
dent supervisory approach to banks' risk management.2 '
These guidelines might be used by financial markets in other
countries to help standardize practices in derivatives markets.
VI. METHODS FOR PREVENTION
As mentioned above, reining in derivatives is probably not
the answer to risk management of derivatives. One
view-albeit a cynical one-is that "[t]he world's schemers are
not so limited in imagination that they would be put off by a
ban on a particular instrument which happens to have been
used to perpetrate a fraud."225 Although it is true that schem-
ers will always find a way to circumvent regulations, the ex-
changes or investment firms using derivatives need to adopt a
system of financial safeguards. 6 Institutions that use deriv-
atives should make clearly-communicated decisions as to the
use of their derivatives activity, implement strong control poli-
cies, adopt a system of financial safeguards, and change their
compensation systems that will help control the risks inherent
in the use of derivatives.
A. Decisions as to Purpose of Derivatives Use
The governing body of the derivative-using institution
must make a decision as to the purpose and the extent of de-
rivatives activity, and must unambiguously communicate its
decision to senior management. The institution should
have exhaustive written policies and procedures to govern its
use of derivatives. 8 Such policies should govern issues such
as managerial responsibilities, scope of activities, scope of
acceptable risks, and risk reporting processes. 9 In addition,
senior management must take steps to educate those who are
224. See Basle/IOSCO Guidelines, supra note 222.
225. John Sandner, Don't Make Derivatives the Scapegoat, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1995, at 17.
226. See id.
227. See Roger D. Blanc, Developing Internal Controls to Manage Derivatives,
INSIGHTS, Apr. 1995, at 7, 9.
228. See Banking Circular No. 277, supra note 139, 62,152, at 71,705.
229. See id.
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responsible for carrying out the institution's derivatives poli-
cies." Moreover, senior management should be responsible
for reviewing the adequacy of these policies and procedures as
business and market circumstances change.2"' In this way,
the derivatives-using institution will have a clear goal for its
derivatives practices, and senior management will bear the
ultimate responsibility for overseeing the procedures and prac-
tices for derivatives use.
Senior management also must be able to understand the
financial strategy of the institution and the manner in which it
will be implemented.232 Furthermore, management should
understand all the complex financial instruments that the
institution chooses to employ, rather than simply relying on
the knowledge of those who deal directly in derivatives."3
Without this understanding, management cannot possibly
make proper decisions about the purposes and extent of the
activity of derivatives. Indeed, management's lack of under-
standing was a problem in the Barings affair. As the Board of
Banking Supervision's report charged, Barings' management
"did not understand their business,"234 but if they had more
knowledge of Leeson's activities, they would have realized that
arbitrage alone could not generate profits as large as Leeson
claimed he was making. 5 Since they were unfamiliar with
the workings of derivatives, Leeson was able to hide the trades
from senior management.
230. See Blanc, supra note 227, at 9; see also Paul Allen Schott, Derivatives: A
Primer on Bank Agency Actions for Managing Risks, 14 No. 7 BANKING POLY
REP., at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bankpol File.
231. See Banking Circular No. 277, supra note 139, 62,152, at 71,705; DERIV-
ATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 9.
232. See Recent Derivatives Losses: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 12 (1994) (testimony of Lewis Teel, Exec-
utive Vice President, Bank of America).
233. See id.
234. Denton, supra note 177, at 6. The report also noted that "controls [were]
ineffective," and that the lack of internal controls led to the unauthorized activities
which brought down Barings. Id. In fact, the head of the group to which Leeson
reported admitted, "My lack of experience in the area was a contributing factor."
Id. (interviewing Ron Baker).
235. See Spot the Smoking Receivable, supra note 209, at 80.
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B. Internal Controls
Institutions must implement a system to ensure that its
officers and employees are following the institution's policies. If
the employees fail to follow those policies, senior management
should respond swiftly and definitively to make necessary
corrections. 6 Thus, the function of senior management
should be to define, and possibly to limit, the permissible uses
of derivatives instruments to serve the company's business
purposesY The institution must also have a system that
leads to the prompt detection of financial and operational
weaknesses, and must back up any system they put in place
with frequent and-more importantly-independent monitor-
ing."8 For example, an independent monitor with less of a
vested interest in Barings' bottom line might have more readi-
ly pointed out that it was unwise to allow Leeson to settle his
own trades, or that Leeson was not hedging his positions prop-
erly. Those people who measure, monitor, and control the risk
for the bank should be managed independently of those who do
the trading and create the risk."9 They should also have suf-
ficient experience and authority to make and direct critical
decisions, if necessary, and their powers should be wide-rang-
ing. ° Unusual changes in a firm's trading activity, large
open positions, accumulated losses, or margin requirements
should trigger action to inquire whether something is
amiss. 1 Risk management personnel should also be experi-
enced enough to appreciate the suitability of certain types of
risk, and should be able to communicate honestly and effective-
ly with senior management so that management is able to
react to potentially dangerous situations before those situa-
tions go too far for correction.2
236. One commentator has also suggested that even the board itself should in-
tervene in certain instances. See Blanc, supra note 227, at 7.
237. See id.
238. See Sandner, supra note 225, at 17.
239. See Banking Circular No. 277, supra note 139, 5 62,152, at 71,705; Schott,
supra note 230, at 19.
240. See Banking Circular No. 277, supra note 139, 62,152, at 71,705;
Sandner, supra note 225, at 17.
241. See Sandner, supra note 225, at 17.
242. As mentioned above, many managers who are involved with derivatives do
not fully understand them. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. As also
mentioned, some have suggested that lack of proper controls is due partially to
what may properly be termed a "generation gap." See supra note 181 and accom-
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None of these monitoring functions were in effect at
Barings. Leeson's back-office functions were ineffectively moni-
tored and Barings Futures Singapore was operated almost
entirely by Leeson alone. Barings' senior management took no
steps to ensure that the appropriate degree of supervision was
in place. 3 Because Leeson had responsibility for both the
front office and the back office, all reconciliations and other de-
tailed control procedures in Barings Futures Singapore were
rendered ineffective.' Since there were no proper manage-
ment controls, Leeson was able to accumulate massive unau-
thorized positions, and by the time the positions were discov-
ered, it was too late to save Barings."5
C. Banks Should Adopt Systems of Financial Safeguards
The institution trading in derivatives must ensure that
sufficient resources are available to cover future obligations
and that accumulation of losses is prevented." Barings did
not take sufficient steps to prevent losses, and, in fact, heavily
contributed to them. Leeson regarded the Barings office in
London as a cash cow and his opinion was justified, since the
London office continued to send money to Singapore, suppos-
edly to cover margin, even though Leeson should not have been
making such large reported profits while using a trading meth-
od that was supposed to be low risk. 7 Further, any system
implemented by derivatives users must ensure the prompt
detection of any financial or operational weaknesses." These
safeguards were not in place at Barings, where Leeson built up
tens of thousands of Simex and Osaka Securities Exchange
contracts and exposed the bank to liability in an amount ap-
proximately twice its net worth.
panying text; see also The Charlie Rose Show (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 27,
1995) (interview with Mark Brickell, Vice Chairman of the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association).
243. See Three Key Reasons, supra note 28, at 5.
244. See Out of Control: Greater Supervision is Urged by the Report Into the
Barings Fiasco, BANKER, Aug. 1995, at 15, 15 [hereinafter Out of Control].
245. See id.
246. See Sandner, supra note 225, at 17.
247. See Out of Control, supra note 244, at 16.
248. See Sandner, supra note 225, at 17. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for
example, has such protections in place. See id.
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D. Banks Should Change Their Compensation Systems
Barings encouraged a win-at-all-costs environment, as do
other organizations, such as securities firms. 9 A different
system of compensation for its traders might ameliorate this
type of environment. Leeson had made a large amount of mon-
ey in bonuses because of the high profits that he had made in
Singapore, which likely encouraged him to make more money
for Barings, regardless of the risky ° Meanwhile, Barings was
so intent on continuing its profits from Singapore that it was
reluctant to impose tight controls."m In addition, Barings did
not provide incentives, such as bonuses that included a com-
parison of profit made with risks taken, which would allow for
bonuses based upon how prudent a trader had been; this lack
of incentives contributed to Barings' downfallY2 Banks
should consider forgoing a commission type of pay structure for
its traders, like the one that was in place at Barings, and in-
stead implementing a system of salary plus bonus.s Thus,
firms would be able to adjust traders' bonuses to reflect the
means by which they achieved favorable results,254 rather
than simply reflecting how much money they had made, re-
gardless of the risk they took. Such a step would counteract
the type of "ends justifies the means" atmosphere that was
present at Barings. This type of system would actually allow
for a negative adjustment in a trader's bonus if a trader pro-
duced high returns but did so by using methods that exposed
the firm to unacceptably high risksY.2 5 A system of this type
must, of course, be supported by a "clearly articulated and
enforced investment philosophy." 6
249. See Donald D. Gallo, How to Succeed in Business Without Betting the
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, § 3, at 10.
250. See id.
251. See Marcus W. Brauchli et al., Barings PLC Official May Have Been
Aware of Trader's Position, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at Al.
252. See Seeger, supra note 3, at A13.
253. See Gallo, supra note 249, at 10.
254. See id.
255. See id.; see also Seeger,. supra note 3, at A13. Seeger suggests that man-
agement might use the value-at-risk method (VAR). As Seeger explains, "VAR
measures how much of a firm's money is at risk each day in its various deriv-
atives contracts and other investment strategies.... Using rudimentary probabil-
ity analysis, it generates a single number to quantify with high probability the
outer limits of what could be lost on any given trading day." Id.
256. Galo, supra note 249, at 10.
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